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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 940
EAN num: 9780547086330
ISBN number: 0547086334
Label: Mariner Books
Manufacturer: Mariner Books
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 304
Printing Date: January 13, 2009
Publishing house: Mariner Books
Sale Popularity Level: 105237
Studio: Mariner Books
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Editor's Notes and Comments:
Product Description:
In this lively and ambitious book, James Sheehan charts
what is perhaps the most radical shift in Europe's history:
its transformation from war-torn battlefield to peaceful,
prosperous society. For centuries, war was Europe's defining
narrative, affecting every aspect of political, social, and cultural
life. But afterWorldWar II, Europe began to reimagine
statehood, rejecting ballooning defense budgets in favor of
material well-being, social stability, and economic growth.
Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? reveals how and why this
happened, and what it means for America and the rest of the
world.
With remarkable insight and clarity, Sheehan covers the
major intellectual and political events in Europe over the past
one hundred years, from the pacifist and militarist movements
of the early twentieth century and two catastrophic world
wars to the fall of the BerlinWall and the heated debate over
Iraq.This authoritative history provides much-needed context
for understanding the fractured era in which we live.
User popularity level:
Rated by buyers 
-
In this popular history, James J. Sheehan investigates the reasons behind the increasingly pacifist foreign policies pursued by European states after World War II. He finds that these policies are a straightforward consequence of the nuclear stalemate between the United and the Soviet Union, which created a protected space in Europe where violent threats to national survival are nearly precluded. Democratization, rapid economic growth, and the emergence of the United States as a hegemonic military power have played contributing roles.
Trends toward democratization very first encouraged the militarization of European states and later encouraged the adoption of more pacific policies. In the second half of the nineteenth century, innovations in military organization and logistics made large conscript armies feasible and necessary. The need to raise large armies shifted the balance of power between elites and the popular classes, so that important decisions, including decisions to go to war, had to be endorsed by a mass citizenry. At the same time, conscripts in citizen armies were exposed to national language, national culture, and the disciplined habits needed to support modern industrial economies. Thus, mass armies enabled the emergence of strong states and strong states were closely identified with their military establishments. In the second half of the twentieth century, after two world wars had been fought on European soil, popular sentiment turned against war as people realized that invasion was unlikely and that war endangers economic progress and standards of living.
Industrialization and economic growth were keys to sucess in modern total war, as war machines - airplanes, tanks, and artillery - were built and destroyed at previously unfathomable rates. But after World War II, industrial recovery and higher living standards created bonds between nations that traded with one another and made Europeans less willing to risk economic progress by engaging in war. Public opinion - now a powerful force in public policy - had caught up to economic arguments against war that dated from the previous century.
The United States - the preponderant economic power during World War II - emerged from the war strengthened while Britain and the European powers were diminished. The newly hegemonic power assumed greater responsibility for maintenance of order in the world, while European states put more emphasis on internal material progress. " 'They had been the centers of vast empires, now they were petty states ... Dominion had gone and with it the grandeur that was one of its main reward.' But by the 1960s, grandeur was no longer an important goals for European states. What mattered ... was material well-being, social stability, economic growth. This is what European electorates demanded of their governments, and this is what governments struggled to provide."
Many Americans, at least until the end of the last Presidential administration, have disdained European pacifism in favor of a more activist U.S. foreign policy model. Sheehan departs from this view, seeing civilian states in Europe, with their emphasis on interdependence and material progress, as remarkable and worth preserving. But he criticizes European leaders who have "seemed to lack the will to do more than talk, threaten, and condemn." Moreover, he notes that civilian states can exist only in a favorable security environment, implying that Europe must remain within the Atlantic alliance.
The book includes 54 pages of end matter, including endnotes, a bibliography, and an index. I did not spend a lot of time with these, but I was disappointed that several quotations in the text were not adequately sourced in the endnotes or bibliography.
Rated by buyers -
This is an important book that only earns four stars due to the many questions left unsaid and unanswered. Sheehan chronicles the transformation of Europe from a collection of military garrison states geared for war as necessary to civilian states that do not look to war or violence of any kind to resolve problems. The historical treatise is done well if lightly with many generalizations in about 170 pages. The remainder of the 227 pages is discusion that is well worth reading.
The author traces the rise of conscription armies required to meet very real threats from neighbors and how pacifism was marginalized as an alternative before World War I. The reality of WWI shocked everyone, and the states that moved toward providing social benefits to their populations rather than confronting aggression militarily between the wars were forced to rely on the Soviet Union and the US to regain their sovereign status. England fought Germany to the last Frenchman in WWI, and when that supply ran out was saved by American intervention. Having learned nothing when World War II rolled around, England again attempted to fight Germany to the last Frenchman, but the French only lasted four weeks. The Soviets became unexpected allies when attacked by Germany, but even then the US had to be brought in to save Western Europe from Germany (and communism.) I guess it's nice to be needed.
Then the malaise set in. Living comfortably under an American military security blanket, Europe was free to develop its economy and social programs while military expenditures remained static. Heroism disappeared as an admirable trait, and the nations transformed themselves to boring, stable, civilian states.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, the neighboring enemy disappeared and Europe became even more complacent. The author goes into the various attempts to form an effective European Force to handle immediate crises, but as Kosovo showed, their efforts were less than successful. The Dutch contingent of soldiers sent to maintain order proved to be unable to defend those refugees in their charge, and indeed, even to defend themselves. The softness of the societies was further shown by the minimal revolutionary fervor developed after 1968 that dissipated fairly readily and without excessive violence.
As a result the author argues that Europe will never become a superpower player although it possesses enormous economic power and a high standard of living. Even more than the US, Europe is a continent in decline, ripe to be conquered by a virile, outside force able to commit itself to violence as a strategy and governed by principles of honor, brotherhood and warrior prowess.
There are many fine analyses of this transformation, but the author leaves the question as to why this has come about for the reader to discover on his own. One is tempted to cite the loss of France's manhood in WWI and England's loss of its colonies (and base of grandeur), but the author does not go heavily into discussing this aspect. In addition, the long term sucess of this trend in providing security to Europe's citizens is clearly in doubt, and the author does not belabor the likelihood of that success. One is left to wonder if the US should pull out all its troops and airforce units from Europe and let Europe go it alone. After the US, what then? I believe from reading this book the answer from Europe would be, "Who cares? We'll handle things somehow." Maybe so, but Europe's history is to call in the American fire brigade to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.
Nonetheless, the author came close to convincing me that pacifism is a realistic alternative to a military option and that the US should consider emulating Europe, particularly since we have oceans between us and likely enemies. Then my natural conservative skepticism took hold and brought me back to consider the risks. Still, there is much to learn and ponder here, and the author is to be commended.
Buy & read this book, regardless of your political orientation.
Rated by buyers 
-
Sheehan's book attempts to explain the 50 year peace that Europe has enjoyed since the close of the Second World War. The early chapters focus on Europe's feeble peace movement, mainly looking to two or three individuals (who he quotes repeatedly) as evidence that such a movement really existed at all. Some objective numbers might have been more convincing, although granted such were probably not available at the time. The strongest part of the book (a touch ironically) was the recap of the two world wars in the European theater. Ultimately, Sheehan is suggesting that the horrors of the world wars were such that Europeans learned their lesson about the futility of violence.
Sheehan's prose is readable, but not engrossing. At the same time, his arguments are not especially convincing, either. Has Europe really progressed to the point where war is no longer possible, or have the last 50 years been an anomaly, based on a willingness to let America be the world's policeman while they tend their own gardens? Sheehan's assertion that future dangers to European security are more likely to come from outside Europe than inside strikes this reviewer as largely irrelevant - there can be no lasting peace as long as there is a group that is willing to make war. This is an ambitious little volume, concisely covering the status of war and peace throughout 20th Century Europe, but don't expect any new insights.
Rated by buyers -
For most of European recorded history, some one has been trying to enlarge their country by taking over parts of some one elses. This could be done one of two ways, marry it or conqueor it. Having seen pictures of many of the princesses from the nineteenth century (especially the Habsburgs) you you can see why most countries chose war. At the beginning of the twentieth century, central Europe was dominated by the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and the Russian Empire in the East (the Ottomans were just a real estate holding company). Having spent the nineteenth century carving up Africa and Asia, the only place left to contest was Europe.
For the Germans the problem was France, for France it was Germany, everyone else was forced to choose up sides. When some one decided to pick on someone elses little brother, all hell broke loose and there was no way to stop it. After slugging it out for four years, the French and British convinced the new kid from across the street to help them gang up on the neighborhood bully (the Germans). Once the dust settled, everyone pointed their fingers at the Germans as being the cause of all the mess that was left.
Since the Germans felt that everyone else had started it, "oh yeah, step over this line and see what happens you krauts!", they were smarting from getting a 'raw deal'. So they licked their wounds and waited for another chance. Unfortunately for the Germans, there new leader was a little off kilter in the head and wasted huge amounts of resources on creating Hitler's version of Dante's Inferno, when the resources could have been better spent. So, this time the Germans got their butts kicked but good. The Italians who actually started all the problems by attacking Albania and Ethiopia (those two well known warrior nations), ended up fighting (if you call it that) against the Germans in the end.
By the end of the Second European War, pretty much even the winners were in bad shape. The British couldn't afford to keep their empire and the French were too embarrassed (for at least a year) to say anything. Most of central and eastern europe had been devastated and the greatest migration of people since the invasion of the Goths and Vandals occurred in Europe. Once things settled down, no one was in the mood for another fight. And since the Americans, who along, with the Russians were the major contributors of money and men it only seemed right to let them play policemen while the rest of Europe got their economies up and running.
Having spent fifty years at peace (well good fences or walls make good neighbors, R.Frost) Europe was happy to let the americans and russians foot the bill for defense. Once the Soviet Union got deep sixed, and the americans decided to leave, it seemed that there was no one to fight. Who were the europeans afraid of? Iraq, Serbia, Libya? The EU is smart enough (ok close) to realize that they have no land enemies (in the sense of other countries) to fear, so what would they need an military for?
Rated by buyers -
A 90+ year old friend who avidly reads, but ONLY non-fiction, was very excited about this book. He had read a review and thought we should purchase it. Now we own three copies and are loaning them out. This book is important for me because my views of European History had been through the eyes and experiences of American soldiers who served in WW II and high school history teachers. Now I know that my understandings were superficial. Sheehan brings us close to how European citizens feel about war and why they have demonstrated in such large numbers against the Iraq War. They hate war, have intimately experienced war, and don't want to study war no more! He explains how their attitudes have been incorporated into and affect each government's relatively small military budget. Sheehan's discusion about the European Union opened my eyes. I did not know how much I could learn from this small book.
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